56 ideas
8797 | The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa] |
8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
16235 | Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley] |
14753 | The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider] |
16072 | 'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman] |
14751 | Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider] |
16071 | Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman] |
16234 | Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley] |
13278 | Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki] |
14750 | Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider] |
8443 | Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts [Sosa] |
8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
8794 | There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa] |
8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
8796 | A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa] |
8799 | If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa] |
8795 | Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa] |
8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
8798 | Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa] |
23590 | Criminal responsibility can be fully assigned to each member of a group [Walzer] |
23578 | Double Effect needs a double intention - to achieve the good, and minimise the evil [Walzer] |
23564 | Deep ethical theory is very controversial, but we have to live with higher ethical practice [Walzer] |
20595 | You can't distribute goods from behind a veil, because their social meaning is unclear [Walzer, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
20592 | Complex equality restricts equalities from spilling over, like money influencing politics and law [Walzer, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
20549 | Equality is complex, with different spheres of equality where different principles apply [Walzer, by Swift] |
23568 | If whole states possess rights, there can be social relations between states [Walzer] |
23572 | Just wars are self-defence, or a rightful intercession in another's troubles [Walzer] |
23587 | Nuclear bombs are not for normal war; they undermine the 'just war', with a new morality [Walzer] |
23581 | The aim of reprisals is to enforce the rules of war [Walzer] |
23567 | Even non-violent intrusive acts between states count as aggression, if they justify resistance [Walzer] |
23570 | The only good reason for fighting is in defence of rights [Walzer] |
23571 | States can rightly pre-empt real and serious threats [Walzer] |
23582 | Reprisal is defensible, as an alternative to war [Walzer] |
23580 | States need not endure attacks passively, and successful reprisals are legitimate [Walzer] |
23588 | With nuclear weapons we have a permanent supreme emergency (which is unstable) [Walzer] |
23593 | Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello are independent; unjust wars can be fought in a just way [Walzer] |
23573 | For moral reasons, a just war must be a limited war [Walzer] |
23577 | Napoleon said 'I don't care about the deaths of a million men' [Walzer] |
23589 | Kidnapped sailors and volunteers have different obligations to the passengers [Walzer] |
23614 | Even aggressor soldiers are not criminals, so they have equal rights with their opponents [Walzer] |
23574 | The duties and moral status of loyal and obedient soldiers is the same in defence and aggression [Walzer] |
23575 | We can't blame soldiers for anything they do which clearly promotes victory [Walzer] |
23584 | Rejecting Combatant Equality allows just soldiers to be harsher, even to the extreme [Walzer] |
23579 | Soldiers will only protect civilians if they feel safe from them [Walzer] |
23586 | What matters in war is unacceptable targets, not unacceptable weapons [Walzer] |
23591 | If the oppressor is cruel, nonviolence is either surrender, or a mere gesture [Walzer] |
23592 | We can only lead war towards peace if we firmly enforce the rules of war [Walzer] |
8442 | What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa] |
8445 | The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa] |
8444 | Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa] |